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The following individuals were dismissed as third-party

defendants by Zandra Perkins without admission of any liability
or compromise of Ms. Perkins7 claims against them:
Eugene Peterson
Allen J. Muelstein
Wynn Scott Hansen
Ernest D. Wright
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) on the basis that
the judgments and order from which the appellants seek relief are
final orders issued by the Third District Court and on the basis
that the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction over these judgments and order. This Court,
however, obtained jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-22(4) and 78-2A-3(2)(k) and Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The final order of the District Court, following post

trial motions was entered on September 3, 1993. Appellant First
General Services filed a timely notice of appeal on October 4,
1993.

Perkins7 cross-appeal was timely filed on October 18,

1993, pursuant to Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Jurisdiction therefore lies with this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues presented to this Court by Perkins7 cross-appeal
are as follows:
I.

Issue No. 1
Did the trial court correctly allow evidence that

Perkins admitted, in her deposition, starting a fire at her
Hillsden residence in January, 1987.

1

a.

Standard of Review
A trial court's decision regarding admission of

evidence is reviewed to determine whether the Court abused its
discretion.

Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution.

605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979); Allstate Insurance Co. v.
James. 845 F.2d 315, 320 (11th Cir. 1988).
II.

Issue No. 2
Did the trial court correctly allow evidence that the

May 1990 fire in the Perkins7 Murray home may have been
intentionally set.
a.

Standard of Review
A trial court,s decision regarding admission of

evidence is reviewed to determine whether the Court abused its
discretion.

Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution.

605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979); Allstate Insurance Co. v.
James. 845 F.2d 315, 320 (11th Cir. 1988).
III. Issue No. 3
Did the trial court error in the way it handled the
issue of insurance fraud.
a.

Standard of Review:
The decision of the trial court regarding improper

comments by counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2

Donohue

v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. James. 835 F.2d 315 (11th Cir.).
b.

Issued Preserved on Appeal:
Bear River maintains that Perkins did not preserve

this issue on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
On May 19, 1990, a fire occurred at Perkins' home in Murray,

Utah.

The fire caused damage to the carport, a portion of the

roof and the north wall of the house and caused smoke damage
throughout the home. Perkins immediately notified her homeowners
insurance company, Bear River.

Perkins contracted with First

General Services to perform certain construction and repair work
on Perkins' home.

First General Services subcontracted work to

Kent Frampton dba Frampton Heating and Air Conditioning
("Frampton") to install an evaporative cooler on the roof of
Perkins' home.
First General Services commenced this action against Perkins
for breach of contract and to foreclose a mechanic's lien. (R. 2
-9).

A parallel mechanic's lien foreclosure and breach of

contract action was commenced by Frampton against Perkins and
First General Services. These two cases were consolidated in the
trial court and tried concurrently.
3

(R. 371-396).

Perkins

denied liability to Frampton and asserted a counterclaim against
Frampton for damages on account of Frampton7s negligence in
performing his work,

(R. 386-389).

Perkins denied liability to First General Services and
asserted a counterclaim against First General Services seeking
damages for breach of contract of approximately $111,000. In
addition, Perkins filed a Third-Party Complaint against Eugene
Peterson of First General Services, for breach of contract,
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, conversion,
unjust enrichment, and constructive trust.

In addition, Perkins

filed a Third-Party Complaint against Bear River Mutual Insurance
Company, as well as several of the directors and claims adjustors
of Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleging negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing, breach of contract, indemnification, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and conversion and seeking
damages of approximately $450,000.

(R. 14-83).

During pre-trial proceedings, all of the individual
defendants were dismissed from the case.
II.

(R. 572-592).

Course of Proceedings.
This case was commenced by First General Services on

October 18, 1990, by filing a complaint seeking recovery of the
sum of $10,658.47 (R. 2-10).

Zandra Perkins filed an answer and
4

counterclaim against First General and a third-party complaint
against Bear River and various individuals associated with Bear
River.

The counterclaim sought amounts of approximately $111,000

from First General Services as well as an amount of approximately
$450,000 from Bear River and several of its directors and claims
adjustors.

(R. 14-84).

Ultimately, after significant effort and

time, Perkins dismissed or dropped her claims against all of the
individual third-party defendants.

Frampton who held a

mechanic's lien on Perkins' home filed an action in Circuit Court
to foreclose a mechanic's lien.

The Frampton case was

consolidated with the First General Service case on or about
September 23, 1991.

(R. 375-396).

The consolidated cases then

proceeded to trial from which this appeal is taken.
A nine day jury trial was conducted from April 19, 1993
through April 30, 1993. The jury returned a special verdict (R.
1577-1599), separately responding to questions regarding the case
between First General and Perkins and Perkins against Bear River.
With respect to the claims against First General and Perkins the
jury responded as follows:
(1) Perkins breached her contract with First General;
(2) Perkins was not unjustly enriched by First General;
(3) The reasonable value of cleaning and restoration
due to First General from Perkins is $10,658.47; and
5

(4) Reasonable attorney7s fees and costs due First
General from Perkins is $52,522.53.
(5)

First General did not breach its contract with Perkins;

(6)

First General did not make negligent

misrepresentations to Perkins;
(7)

First General did not commit fraud against

Perkins; and
(8)

First General did not commit slander of title

against Perkins.
The jury found with respect to the claims of Perkins against
Bear River as follows:
(1)

Bear River did not breach its contract with Perkins;

(2)

Bear River did not act in bad faith;

(3)

Bear River did not overpay monies to or on behalf

of Perkins; and
(4)

Bear River owed $5,100 to Perkins for damages

resulting in the May, 1990 fire.
After hearing Perkins7 Objection to The Form of the Proposed
Judgment, the Court entered two judgments on July 6, 1993
specifically based on the jury's special verdict.

One judgment

related to the claims of Zandra Perkins against Bear River (R.
1569-1572), and the other judgment related to the claims against
First General Services and Zandra Perkins.
6

In addition Ms. Perkins objected to the Court's award of
costs to Bear River.
judgment.

The matter was briefed and argued post-

In addition to the dispute regarding the award of

costs to Bear River, the parties filed the following formal post
trial motions:
(1)

Zandra Perkins filed a Motion for Judgment Notwith-

standing the Verdict or in the alternative Motion for New Trial;
(2)

Frampton filed a motion to amend its judgment to

include additional attorney's fees; and
(3)

First General Services filed a Motion to Amend the

Judgment to include additional attorney's fees after the second
day of trial.
A hearing on all post trial motions and the award of costs
to Bear River was held on August 5, 1993.

At the end of that

hearing the trial court ruled on each of those motions from the
bench.
(1)

Specifically, the trial court ruled:
Perkins' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict was granted in part and denied in part;
(2)

Perkins' Motion for a New Trial was denied;

(3)

The attorney's fees and costs award by the jury to

First General Services was reduced from $52,522.53 to
the principal amount of First General's claim
($10,658.47);

7

(4)

First General's Motion to Amend the Judgment to

include additional attorney's fees was denied;
(5)

First General was ordered to pay the Frampton

judgment entered against Zandra Perkins on Frampton's
Motion for Summary Judgment, including Frampton's
attorney's fees under the Mechanic's lien statute;
(6)

Frampton's Motion to Amend his Judgment to Include

Additional Attorney's Fees in defending against
Perkins' offset claims was denied; and
(7)

Costs would be limited to filing fees and

deposition costs for opposing parties and opposing
parties expert witnesses.
(R. 1774-1779 and 5168).
Over First General Service's objections, final order and
judgment which purports to incorporate the trial court's bench
ruling was entered on September 3, 1993.

First General Services

appealed from that order of September 3, 1993.

The Notice of

Appeal was timely and properly filed by First General Services on
October 4, 1993.

Both Perkins and Frampton filed timely cross

appeals on October 6, 1993 and October 18, 1993, respectfully.
(R. 1801-1803, 1809-1813).

8

III. Statement of Facts.
1.

On May 19, 1990, a fire partially destroyed a home

located at 5510 South 640 West, Murray, Utah, owned by Zandra
Perkins ("Perkins").

(R. 517-576, 639). Prior to, and at the

time of the fire, Zandra Perkins was temporarily living and
working in Arizona.

The home was not occupied.

(R. 4863, 4894-

95) .
2.

Perkins' home was insured against fire losses by Bear

River Mutual Insurance Company ("Bear River").

(R. 517, 576).

Bear River's insurance policy contained policy limits for
dwelling of $85,000, for unscheduled personal property
("contents") of $59,500 and an additional living expense policy
limit of $17,000.
3.

(R. 68).

Just days after the May 19, 1990 fire, Bear River

learned that Perkins had a previous fire in a home on Hillsden
Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah, in January of 1987. Bear River
learned that Perkins had set the Hillsden home on fire. (R.
4291).

Perkins had a previous fire at her Murray home in March

of 1990 for which Perkins made a claim under her policy with Bear
River.

Bear River also learned from the Murray City Fire

Department that the May 19, 1990 fire was being investigated as
suspicious.

Bear River knew Perkins had the two previous fires,

yet Bear River immediately issued a draft on the loss for
9

additional living expenses on May 21, 1990, and made no effort to
delay because of the suspicious origin of the fire.

(R. 4541-

4532).
4.

After being contacted by Perkins, Richard Dio ("Dio"),

the adjustor from Bear River met with Perkins at her home on May
21, 1990.

(R. 3140, 3159).

During Dio's visit with Perkins, Dio

presented Perkins with a Proof of Loss claim form and explained
to her that the Proof of Loss needed to be submitted within 60
days from the date of the fire, pursuant to the insurance policy
provisions.

(R. 4299-4300).

A Proof of Loss provides the

insurance company with a description of the loss, how the loss
occurred and how much the damages were, and provides the insurer
with some indication that the loss was legitimate.
4300, 4549).

(R. 4299-

It was Perkins' responsibility to see that the

Proof of Loss was properly submitted to Bear River within the 60
days.

(R. 75). Perkins' own expert stated that an insurance

company has a right to stand on the terms of is policy.
(R. 4106).

Perkins did not file a Proof of Loss during the first

three months following the fire at her home.
5.

(R. 4300-4549).

During Dio's discussions with Perkins on May 21, 1990,

Perkins requested contractor names from Dio.

Dio gave her two

references to contractors who were geographically located near
Perkins' home.

(R. 3144).

That same day, Perkins called Eugene
10

Peterson of First General Services and asked if Peterson would
come and take a look at the home.

(R. 3505).

Peterson met with

Perkins at her home on May 22, 1990 at 10:00 a.m.
meeting, Peterson did a scope of the damage.

During that

(R. 5306).

On that

same day, Peterson presented an Access and Authorization card to
Perkins and explained to Perkins that the purpose of the Access
and Authorization card was to evidence that First General
Services worked for Perkins and not for the insurance company, to
give First General Services the authorization to do the work and,
to allow the insurance company to include First General Serviced
name on any checks or drafts that they would issue on behalf of
the claim.

(R. 5315).

The following day, May 23, 1990, Peterson

again met with Perkins at her home and was introduced to Perkins'
sister, Marsha Smith ("Smith").

(R. 5315).

Mr. Peterson

subsequently received the Access and Authorization card signed by
Perkins on May 24, 1990.
6.

(R. 5316).

Peterson prepared a scope of damage and estimated that

the total price to repair the dwelling would be $50,709.91.
2889).

(R.

Peterson estimated that because of the limited fire

damage and smoke damage in the home, that the contents in the
home could be cleaned at a total price of $1,940.24.

(R. 2889).

Peterson's estimate to repair and restore the dwelling was
reasonable in light of industry standards.
11

(R. 3201, 3210).

7.

In the middle of June, 1990, Bear River advanced

$10,000 to First General Services to provide seed money to First
General Services so that the restoration work could continue.
Bear River advanced another $10,000 to First General Services in
July for restoration work.

(R. 4542, 4544, Third-Party Defendant

Exhibit 131).
8.

Between the date Perkins signed the contract, and July

13, 1990, neither Perkins nor Smith ever complained about the
work being performed by First General Services either in terms of
its quality or the timeliness of its completion.

(R. 2895).

During one of the visits by Perkins on or about July 13, 1990,
she met with Peterson at her home.

At that time, she requested

that First General Services convert the carport to a garage and
bill the insurance company for the work.

Peterson stated that

First General Services would be willing to do the work to convert
the carport to a garage, but that it would not bill the insurance
company for that work, for to do so would be insurance fraud.
(R. 2891-2895).

Following the July 13, 1990, meeting, Perkins

and Smith began complaining about First General Service's work on
the home.
9.

(R.

2895-2896).

On July 30, 1990, Perkins terminated First General

Services' contract and insisted that it perform no further work
on the project.

(R. 2912-2913).
12

At the time Perkins terminated

First General Services, First General Services claimed that
Perkins still owed them $10,658.47,

(R. 2937).

Perkins,

immediately after terminating First General Services, gave Bear
River strict orders not to pay any more money to First General
Services.

(R. 4323).

On September 27, 1990, First General

Services filed a Notice of Lien on Perkins' home asserting a
Mechanic's Lien for Perkins failure to pay the balance due and
owing.

(R. 6). On October 18, 1990, First General Services

filed a Complaint in which they moved to foreclose the Mechanic's
Lien and brought an action against Perkins for breach of
Contract.
10.

(R. 2-13).
In September of 1990, Don White, of Bear River, at

Perkins' request, asked Peterson to remove the lien First General
Services had placed on Perkins' home. However, First General
Services refused to remove the lien.
11.

(R. 4306-4307).

Perkins did not submit her first claim for contents

until early September, 1990. Perkins submitted a document to
Bear River which contained numerous pages of items she was
claiming were damaged or destroyed in the fire under the contents
portion of the Bear River policy.

(R. 4301-4302).

Bear River

immediately responded to Perkins' content claim by informing
Perkins that the claim was insufficient, that it lacked
supporting documentation and that the individual content
13

descriptions lacked the necessary information which would enable
Bear River to verify the replacement cost of the items.
(R. 4306).
12.

Despite Perkins inadequate and unsubstantiated content

claim, Bear River advanced $10,000 to Perkins to be applied to
contents in October of 1990.

(R. 4316).

Perkins was informed

that the $10,000 was an advance on contents and that Bear River
was advancing the $10,000 even though sufficient documentation
had not been provided to Bear River to justify any payment of the
content claim.

(R. 4316).

Perkins was informed on several

occasions by Bear River that Bear River was only required, under
the policy, to pay actual cash value for Perkins' alleged content
claim, and that replacement value would not be paid to Perkins
until she submitted evidence of proof of replacement.
13.

Bear River did make content payments to Perkins for

actual cash value in a total amount of $35,953.00.
14.

(R. 4320).

(R. 4077).

Perkins' own expert admitted that to pay a contents

claim an insurance company would need at a minimum a brand name
for the content item claimed, the make of model of the
content item, the year it was purchased and the approximate
amount that the insured paid for the content item.
15.

(R. 4194).

On November 6, 1990, Bear River, because of the threat

of impending litigation, hired an independent insurance adjustor,
14

Bradley Bloom ("Bloom"), in an attempt to bring Perkins' claim to
a resolution.

(R. 4442) . In attempting to bring a resolution to

Perkins' content claim, Bloom reviewed the documentation that had
been provided to Bear River by Perkins.

Bloom determined that he

would need more information from Perkins to adequately adjust the
content claim.

Bloom recognized that the descriptions provided

by Perkins for many of the content items lacked sufficient
description to even adjust the claim.

(R.

4446-4448).

At the

time Bloom was working with Victor Lawrence, attorney for
Perkins, to try to settle the contents claim before they moved on
to the claims for the dwelling and additional living expenses.
(R. 4450) . Lawrence expressed concern to Bloom that the 180 day
time limit for obtaining replacement cost by Perkins was running
out.

Bloom suggested to Bear River that Bear River extend the

180 day time period for Perkins to obtain replacement value of
her contents.

(R. 4452-4454).

Bloom offered to settle the

content claim at a replacement value of $47,836.77. Bear River
agreed that Perkins would have 90 days from the date of
settlement of the content claim to replace the content items to
receive full replacement value.

(R.

4454, 4460).

Bear River

agreed that a 25% depreciation would be applied and that Perkins
would receive 75% of the $47,836.77 with the remaining 25% to be
paid upon proof of replacement.

(R. 4461).
15

16.

Perkins responded to Bear River's offer on January 7,

1991, demanding that she receive $52,644.95 immediately.

Perkins

demanded that Bear River pay this amount as full replacement cost
without requiring Perkins to show proof of replacement.

In

addition, Perkins demanded that her additional living expenses be
paid by the insurance company per her demand of $19,000, which
was $2,000 above policy limits.

(R. 4462).

Bear River refused

to pay Perkins' additional living expenses as demanded and
refused to pay Perkins for replacement value on her contents
claim without Perkins replacing the items and showing proof of
replacement.
17.

(R.

4462-4465).

On January 8, 1991, Perkins filed a Third-Party

Complaint against Bear River alleging that Bear River had
breached its contract and alleged that Bear River did so in bad
faith.
18.

(R. 14).
Bear River was prevented from settling the content

claim because Perkins demanded that she receive replacement cost
without replacing the items and because she demanded that her
additional living expense be paid without question.

Bear River

instructed Bloom to adhere to the policy provisions and require
proof of replacement before replacement costs would be paid for
contents. (R. 4320).

Perkins never submitted any documentation

of proof of replacement.

(R.

4321-4322).
16

Perkins' own expert

admitted that the delay in resolving the contents claim was
caused by Perkins' demand for replacement cost without having to
establish proof of replacement.

(R. 4064).

Perkins' expert

admitted that Bear River's extension of the 180 replacement
period was an act of good faith on Bear River's part.

(R. 4065).

Perkins' expert also admitted that Bear River would be justified
in not paying replacement cost until the items were replaced.
(R. 4073).
19.

Bear River paid toward Perkins' dwelling claims the

total amount of $54,609.00.

(R. 4077).

The evidence clearly

indicated that the reasonable value of Perkins' dwelling claim
was approximately $50,000.

(R. 2889, 3201, 3210).

Perkins

continued to demand policy limits of $85,000 on her dwelling
claim.
20.

(R. 48).
After First General Services was terminated on July 30,

1990, Leo Thorup ("Thorup") was retained by Perkins to act as
general contractor.

(R. 3580).

Bear River was informed in

October of 1990 of Thorup's involvement.

(R. 3750).

Dio

attempted to find out what work Thorup was going to do on the
home and what he was going to charge Perkins for that work
immediately after finding out of Thorup's involvement.
3751).

17

(R. 3750-

21.

After Bear River discovered Thorup's involvement in the

restoration of Perkins7 home, Bear River demanded that Thorup
provide a bid to Bear River.

Bear River received a statement

from Thorup the first of November, 1990.

Immediately Dio called

Thorup and requested a break down on what Dio thought was a bid.
(R. 3758-3759).

Thorup admitted at trial that most of the work

set forth on his statement received by Bear River the first of
November, 1990, had been completed before the statement had been
sent to Bear River.

(R.

3621).

breakdown of this statement.

Thorup never did provide a

(R. 3759-3761).

Bear River did not

receive anything from Thorup until January 22, 1991.

(R. 3761-

3763).
22.

After receiving Thorup's invoice on January 22, 1991,

Bloom, representing Bear River, met with Thorup at Thorup's home
on January 29, 1991.

(R. 3629).

for overhead and profit.

On Thorup's invoice was a claim

Thorup admitted, however, during that

meeting, that he had nothing to do with a substantial portion of
his bill and should not be claiming profit or overhead for part
of his invoice.

(R. 3629) . In fact, Thorup admitted agreeing

with Bloom that if Bear River would pay him $4,000 it would be in
complete settlement of Thorup's claim against Bear River.
3630).

(R.

Thorup also admitted at trial that approximately $8,000

of amounts on his invoice were going back to Perkins.
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(R. 3634).

In fact, Thorup testified that Bear River still owed him $38,000
and that he was going to give the entire $38,000 back to Perkins,
(R. 3635) .
23.

Bear River was prevented from settling the dwelling

claim because of the dispute between Perkins and First General
Services and because of the lack of documentation from Thorup.
(R. 3320).

Perkins gave Bear River a strict order not to pay any

more money to First General Services and this created an
untenable position to Bear River.
24.

(R. 4323, 4059, 4063).

Bear River clearly had no duty to supervise Perkins'

general contractors.

(R. 4562-4563) . The reasonable bid to

restore Perkins' dwelling was approximately $50,000. Bear River
paid in excess of $54,000.

(R. 4565).

Bear River's dwelling

payments were reasonable based on the evidence that Bear River
had regarding Perkins' dwelling claims.
25.

(R. 4565).

In October of 1990, Perkins made a claim for additional

living expenses.

Upon receipt of Perkins claim, Bear River

immediately notified Perkins that her additional living expense
claim needed to be supported with invoices and proof that Perkins
had incurred the additional living expense.
26.

(R. 4310-4311).

In response to Bear River's demand, Perkins had her

mother send invoices to Bear River indicating that she had
charged Perkins $50.00 a day for a room in her mother's home for
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158 days from the date of the fire through November 6, 1990.
3465, 3466).

(R.

Perkins7 mother also charged Perkins $20.00 a day

for 108 days for meals provided to Perkins while allegedly
staying at her mother's home.

(R. 3466).

In addition, Perkins'

mother charged Perkins $9.90 a day for 136 days relating to
laundry services.
78).

(R. 3461, Third-Party Defendant Exhibit 77 and

Perkins admitted at trial that she was not in town for more

than 5 weeks during the time period that her mother charged her
for room and board and laundry services.
27.

(R. 3467-3468).

While on the witness stand at trial, Perkins withdrew

her claim for additional living expenses relating to the invoices
submitted by her mother.
28.

(R. 3462).

Because Bear River knew that Perkins was out of town

during the time that Perkins' mother was charging her for room
and board and for laundry service, Perkins' additional living
expense claim was never settled because Bear River rejected her
claim.
29.
claim.

(R.

4324).

Bear River bent over backwards to adjust this difficult
Bear River's handling of the claim was fair and Bear

River went beyond what one would normally expect.

(R. 4567).

Bear River paid in total, to Perkins or on her behalf,
$91,062.00.

(R. 4073, 4077).

Bear River made payments
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throughout the process of Perkins' loss and before adequate
documentation was presented.

(R. 4573).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly admitted limited evidence of the
1987 Hillsden fire and evidence that the May 19, 1990 fire was
intentionally set. This evidence was totally relevant to Bear
River's defenses to Perkins' bad faith claims and evidence of
good faith.

Further, this relevant evidence had little if any

effect on the outcome of the trial. Clearly, any prejudicial
effect on Perkins did not substantially outweigh the probative
value of the evidence.

It is dispositive that the trial judge

himself recognized the evidence regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire,
in the limited scope that it was presented to the jury, had
little if any impact on the trial, and did not unfairly prejudice
Perkins.
Even assuming the trial court did commit error with regard
to the 1987 fire and the May 19, 1990 fire the error was
harmless.

The evidence at trial overwhelming proves that Bear

River not only acted in complete good faith, but in fact bent
over backwards to adjust Perkins claims and in so doing paid to
Perkins more than $91,000. The evidence clearly shows that it
was Perkins' non-compliance with the policy of insurance and her
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unreasonable demands which prevented a more speedy resolution of
her claims.
Mention of insurance fraud by counsel for Bear River in its
opening statement did not warrant a mistrial.

Counsel for

Perkins made a motion for mistrial or in the alternative for the
judge to admonish the jury.

The trial judge did admonish the

jury by reading verbatim a statement which had been prepared and
agreed to by counsel for Perkins. No further mention of insurance fraud was made during the course of trial.

Consequently,

Perkins has not preserved her right to appeal on this issue. The
trial judge did exactly as requested by Perkins7 counsel.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Correctly Allowed Limited Evidence of
the 1987 Hillsden Fire and the Suspicious Nature of the
May 1990 Fire.
a.

Evidence of the Hillsden Fire and the suspicious nature
of the May 19, 1990 fire was Relevant to the Issues in
the case.

When an insured brings a cause of action for bad faith
against an insurance company, the insurer is entitled to present
evidence on the issue of its good faith.
Store

Steinberg's Department

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 407 N.E.2d 124 (111. 1980).

Perkins brought suit against Bear River, claiming Bear River
acted in bad faith in handling the May 19, 1990 fire claim,
despite the undisputed evidence that Bear River paid Perkins more
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than $91,000 under her policy.

As part of Bear River's defense

to the claim of bad faith it was entitled to show that it made
payment on the 1990 fire claim even though it knew Perkins had
had a prior fire which she herself started and even though it
knew that the May 1990 fire was suspicious. Knowledge of the
1987 Hillsden fire started by Perkins would have given Bear River
valid reason to question the legitimacy of the 1990 fire claim.
Evidence of the 1987 fire at Perkins' Hillsden residence and the
suspicious nature of the 1990 fire is highly relevant to the
issue of Bear River's good faith in the way that it adjusted
Perkins' claim.
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: "Relevant
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."

Immediately after the May 19, 1990 fire in

Perkins' home, Bear River became aware of the 1987 fire at
Perkins' Hillsden residence.

Bear River's knowledge of the 1987

fire and Perkins' involvement in that fire clearly could raise
questions about Perkins' entitlement to coverage for the 1990
fire and could also have had an impact upon the manner in which
Bear River adjusted the May 19, 1990 fire.
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The fact that Bear River immediately dispersed funds to
Perkins and to First General Services, despite having knowledge
of the 1987 fire and Perkins involvement in that fire is evidence
of Bear River7s good faith towards Perkins and the manner in
which it adjusted her claim.

The issue of the 1987 fire was

brought to the attention of the trial court through the filing by
Perkins7 of a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Prior
Criminal Conviction.

(R. 794-796).

Perkins argued that the 1987

conviction for reckless burning had been expunged and was
therefore fundamentally inadmissible.

(R. 795). When that

matter came on for hearing before the trial court, the trial
court ruled as follows:
The second motion, Perkins7 Motion to Exclude Prior
Criminal Convictions, I would rule this way: I would
grant the motion to stop any testimony as to her being
convicted, both as to burning and also as to
shoplifting. I would deny the motion as to whether she
had intentionally set the fire.
In other words, what I am saying, is that I don't think
criminal convictions are material, but I think the
intentional setting of the fire as a defense does go to
it.
(R. 32747).
The issue was again raised by counsel for Perkins following
the enpanelment of the jury on the first day of trial. (R. 52775286).

After hearing argument from Perkins7 counsel and Bear

River7s counsel, the court stated as follows:
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The court does remember the last argument as far as
what you are saying, what the insurance company did as
far as its investigating into, and the argument made by
Mr. Heath.
The court does not feel that it has heard anything
different than what it heard before in this matter, and
is still of the opinion that if a claim is therefore
made for bad faith, they're entitled to go into this to
show the defense of the claim for bad faith.
If that claim were dropped, then I would grant it. But
I just am still of the opinion that the testimony here
does not go to anything different than what I was
thinking at the time; therefore, I would deny the
motion and let my ruling stand, the prior ruling, and
allow them to do it, if the claim for bad faith is
still present.
And, as I understand it, it is.
(R. 5285-5286).
Again, in the afternoon of the first day of trial, counsel
for Perkins moved for a mistrial on the basis that counsel for
Bear River stated in its opening statement that Perkins had
admitted in her deposition that she had an earlier fire in 1987
at her Hillsden home and had intentionally set the fire.

The

trial court after hearing argument from counsel denied the motion
for mistrial and stated as follows:
As far as the other matters are concerned, no, I think
I understand what's going on on that, and I understand
what both of you are saying. I still am of the opinion
that as long as the cause of action is there for bad
faith, they have the right to be able to rely on that,
that testimony, and in that event I would deny the
motion on that.
(R. 5333).
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The trial court, due to counsel for Perkins persistence, had
ample opportunity to consider the relevancy of the 1987 Hillsden
fire.

The trial court carefully examined the issue and excluded

the irrelevant facts relating to the 1987 fire.

However, the

trial court correctly admitted the relevant facts relating to the
1987 fire and the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire and
allowed Bear River to present evidence of its good faith by
allowing the jury to hear evidence that Perkins had had an
earlier fire and that Perkins had admitted that she intentionally
set that fire.
Other courts have been faced with the same evidentiary issue
and have uniformly allowed evidence of previous fires on the
basis that the evidence is highly relevant to the conduct and the
manner in which the insurance company adjusted a claim.

For

example, in Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 780 P.2d 116
(Idaho 1989), an insurer brought an action against his insurance
company for bad faith denial of fire insurance proceeds. The
insurance company defended by contending that the insured was
responsible for intentionally setting a prior fire.

The trial

court allowed Safeco to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had
sustained a fire loss in 1982. This evidence was received over
strenuous objection.

The appeals court recognized that evidence
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of the prior fire was critical to the issue of whether Safeco
acted in bad faith.

Id.

at 120.

Clearly, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge and the exercise of this
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing
of an abuse thereof.

Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile

Institution. 608 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979).

The trial court

in the case at hand did not abuse its discretion in allowing
limited evidence of the 1987 fire in Perkins' Hillsden home. In
fact, some courts have held that excluding such evidence is
prejudicial error.

In Rutledge v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.

Co., 334 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. Appeals 1985), the trial court was
asked to allow evidence of a previous fire loss sustained by the
plaintiff.

An offer of proof was made by the insurance company

that the plaintiff had suffered a loss due to fire approximately
one year before sustaining the loss due to the fire at issue in
the case.

The offer of proof indicated the prior loss occurred,

as did the one in question, on the insured7s business property
known as the Fig Leaf Lounge during the early morning hours
shortly after a business associate of the plaintiff left the
lounge.

The trial court limited consideration of any evidence

relating to the prior loss solely to the issue of a bad faith
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refusal by the insurance company to pay insurance benefits to the
plaintiff.
The appeals court agreed that the evidence of the prior loss
was relevant to the issue of the bad faith on the part of the
insurance companies, however, the appeals court went further and
indicated that because the insurance company had refused to pay
insurance benefits because they believed that plaintiff was
responsible for starting the fire, all the facts relating to the
previous fire should have been admissible.

Id. at 136-137.

Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire, in the limited nature
that the trial court allowed the evidence to be presented, and
evidence of the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire was
totally relevant to the issues in this case. The fact that
Perkins was claiming bad faith against Bear River made the
evidence relevant and the trial court, as did the South Carolina
trial court, in Rutledge, recognized the relevancy of the prior
fire as it went to the issue of the insurance company's bad
faith.
b.

The Probative Value of Evidence of the Previous Fire
and the Fact that the May 19. 1990 Fire Was Intentionally Set Outweighed any Prejudicial Effect to Perkins.

Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire was limited by the trial
court to a statement that the fire occurred and that Perkins
admitted that she intentionally set the fire. No evidence of her
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conviction of reckless burning was allowed and Bear River was
precluded from asking Perkins why and how she set the Hillsden
home on fire. Moreover, evidence that the May 1990 fire was
intentionally set was also limited.

The trial court precluded

any evidence as to who may have set the fire.

The jury was only

allowed to know that the May 1990 fire was suspicious and
intentionally set.
The relevance and probative value of this evidence has been
previously explained.

Perkins suggests to this Court that

evidence of the 1987 fire and evidence of the suspicious nature
of the May 1990 fire was the only evidence Bear River presented
in its defense.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

In

actuality, though relevant and probative, the limited evidence of
the 1987 fire and the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire had
little, if any, prejudicial effect on Perkins. Ultimately,
evidence against Perkins7 bad faith claims was so overwhelming
that the limited evidence of the 1987 fire and the suspicious
nature of the May 1990 fire (even assuming its admission were
error) was inconsequential and certainly not the grounds for
reversal.
The trial itself lasted for 9 days, yet evidence of the 1987
Hillsden fire consisted of no more than a total of one half page
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of trial transcript.

The Hillsden fire was first mentioned in

counsel for Bear River's opening statement as follows:
There is also another Zandra Perkins who also admitted
in her deposition that she set a home on fire on
Hillsden Drive, a home that she owned at the time in
1987. . . (R. 2834).
The Hillsden fire was again discussed during cross
examination of Perkins by counsel for Bear River as follows:
Q:

Now also in your deposition you recall admitting that
you had a prior fire in 1987 at another residence; is
that right?

A:

Yes.

Q:

That you admitted you set the fire on that residence on
Hillsden Drive?

A:

That fire was caused by some carelessness by me.

Q:

Didn't you in fact say in your deposition that you set
the fire?

A:

I don't recall the words.

Q:

I asked if you didn't say, in your deposition,
that you didn't know why you set the fire.

A:

I could have.

I don't recall.

(R. 3499-3501).
The Hillsden fire was again mentioned during direct
examination by counsel for Bear River of Donald M. White, the
former loss services manager for Bear River as follows:
Q:

Did information come to you the very next day [May 25,
1990] that the insured had had a prior fire?

A:

Yes.
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(R. 4291)
Finally, the last mention of the 1987 fire occurred in
direct examination of Captain Hall of the Murray City Fire
Department as follows:
Q:

Did you have occasion to inform him [Mr. Dio] that
Zandra Perkins had a record of a previous fire?

A:

Yes yes I did hear there was a previous fire.

(R. 4421-4423).
There was absolutely no other mention in the record of the
Hillsden fire.

The sum and substance of the Hillsden fire as the

evidence came out had no real impact or prejudicial effect to
Perkins.

In fact, the trial judge himself stated on the record

that evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire had no effect on the
outcome of the case:
Of course, Mr. Campbell [counsel for Perkins] makes a
great deal as far as the court's ruling, allowing into
evidence on the first fire. I don't know what impact
that had on a jury. I do know that, as it came in, the
impact it had on the court was a lot less than this
court anticipated it would be, the way Mr. Heath went
at it and passed over; that it almost, to this court - this court did not have - - it did not have any
impact at all.
And certainly, it was not the impact, in this court's
opinion, that Mr. Campbell argues that it had.
(R. 5160-5161) (Emphasis added).
The trial court in the instant case in exercising its
discretion to admit the limited evidence of the 1987 Hillsden
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fire first determined that the evidence was relevant and then
determined that its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect, which is the
standard under Rule 403, U.R.E.

It is not enough for Perkins to

argue under Rule 403 that the evidence is prejudicial. Most
evidence is prejudicial to one degree or another.
requirement under Rule 403 is much more stringent.

The
Perkins had

to show the probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.

This she did not do. The

determination regarding relevancy of evidence is a matter of
discretion with the trial court and will be reversed only upon a
showing of manifest abuse of discretion which occurs only when no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.
Crescent Harbor Water Co. v. Lvseinq. 753 P.2d 555, 559 (Wash.
App. 1988) .
It is dispositive that the trial judge himself recognized
that the evidence regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire and the
suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire, in the limited scope that
it was presented to the jury, had little if any impact on the
trial, and did not unfairly prejudice Perkins.

This Court should

give great deference to the trial judge on matters of evidence
because he had the advantage of viewing the entire trial. Nelson
v. Nelson, 513 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Utah 1973); McCuffev v. Turner.
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5423 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1967).

Clearly, the probative value of

the evidence with respect to Bear River's defense against
Perkins' claims of bad faith outweighed any prejudicial effect
that the evidence may have had.
c.

Even If The Trial Court Committed Error In Admitting
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Fire and Evidence that
the May 19, 1990 Fire Was Intentionally Set, the Error
was Harmless

The fact that a trial court may abuse its discretion by
admitting or excluding evidence does not necessitate, by itself,
reversal.

Slusher v. Ospital. 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989).

In

Slusher, the trial court excluded evidence regarding a settlement
agreement between plaintiff and one of the defendants. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court had committed error by
excluding said evidence. However, the Supreme Court also found,
after considering the totality of the evidence, that the error
was harmless and did not warrant reversal. The Court stated:
Of course, the trial court's error does not necessitate
reversal and the accompanying need for a costly and
burdensome new trial if the error was harmless i.e., if
"there is no reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) See, e.g., State
v. Kniaht, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987); Belden v.
Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319, 1321 (Utah Ct. of
App. 1988) see also Utah Rules Evidence 103(a); Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 61. We conclude that the
court's error was harmless given the totality of
circumstances in which it was made.
Id. at 444.
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Perkins, in her brief, has failed to cite any evidence which
even remotely establishes there was a reasonable likelihood that
the alleged error of the trial court in admitting limited
evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire and evidence that the May 19,
1990 fire was intentionally set affected the outcome of the
proceedings.

Perkins simply claims error and then concludes it

was prejudicial without even discussing the totality of the
evidence against her in this case.
Clearly, Perkins is required to show more than error.
must show prejudicial error that is harmful.
be presumed on appeal.

She

Prejudice will not

Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,

780 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1989).

In Pacheco the court determined that

improperly admitted evidence would be considered harmless if
there is other competent evidence to the same effect upon which a
jury could reach the same results.

Id at 120. Accordingly, the

Court concluded that there was no prejudicial error.

Id.

Perkins has failed to marshall any evidence to establish a
reasonable likelihood that the alleged error affected the outcome
of the proceedings.

Frankly, there is no evidence that can be

marshalled to substantiate Perkins claim.

The trial court has

stated on the record that the evidence had no impact on the
proceedings.

In fact, the overwhelming weight of the evidence

considered in its totality, establishes that Bear River bent over
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backwards to adjust this difficult claim in the utmost good
faith, and that any and all delays, and problems associated
therewith were caused by Perkins.
Specifically, Bear River knew immediately after the May 19,
1990 fire had occurred that Perkins had a previous fire in 1987
and had intentionally set that fire.

Bear River knew immediately

after the May 19, 1990 fire that that very fire was of a
suspicious nature.

Nevertheless, Bear River responded by

immediately meeting with Perkins at her residence on the 21st day
of May, 1990, and at that time advancing monies to Perkins for
additional living expenses.

Even though the Murray City Fire

Department's investigation of the suspicious fire continued, Bear
River continued to adjust this claim as they would any other
claim.

After Perkins had entered into a contract with First

General Services, Bear River advanced $20,000 to First General
Services when First General Services requested the advance from
Bear River.
When Bear River was notified around the first of August,
1990, that Perkins had terminated First General Services and that
Bear River should make no further payments to First General
Services, Bear River fully complied with Perkins directions.
However, the dispute between Perkins and First General Services
prevented Bear River from settling the dwelling claim.
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For several months thereafter Perkins attempted to complete
the restoration process by hiring additional general contractors
and subcontractors, including Leo Thorup to complete the
restoration.
River.

Thorup admitted he never submitted a bid to Bear

Bear River did not receive any documentation from Thorup

until the work was substantially complete.
With respect to Perkins7 contents claim, Perkins herself
admitted that a claim was not submitted to Bear River until early
September 1990. The evidence is further clear that Bear River
immediately responded and notified Perkins that her claim was
insufficient in that it was not supported by proper documentation
and did not contain adequate descriptions of the property.
Despite Bear River's reasonable requests for further
documentation, Perkins did not provide any supporting
documentation, nor did she provide adequate descriptions of the
content claim she was making.

Notwithstanding the obvious

inadequacy of Perkins' content claim, Bear River, in good faith,
advanced $10,000 to Perkins thereon in the Fall of 1990.
The evidence is further clear from Perkins' own bad faith
expert that an insurance company such as Bear River has every
right to insist that an insured comply with the requirements and
provisions of the policy.

Yet despite Perkins non-compliance

with the terms of her insurance policy with Bear River, Bear
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River still advanced monies without sufficient documentation and
continued in good faith to try to adjust this claim.
In early January of 1991 for example, Bear River still did
not have a properly documented contents claim from Perkins.
Nonetheless, Bear River assigned a replacement value for Perkins
content claim of approximately $47,000.

Moreover, Bear River

agreed to raise the cash value from 50% of replacement value to
75% of replacement value.

This offer was presented to Perkins

who immediately rejected it and instead demanded $52,000 for
replacement value and that she receive the full amount without
having to actually replace any items, contrary to the terms of
the policy.

Moreover, Perkins demanded that her additional

living expense in the amount of $19,000 be paid in full even
though her demand exceeded policy limits and even though the
claims made for additional living expense were clearly suspicious
and false.
Specifically, Perkins made her claim for additional living
expenses in the Fall of 1990.

Bear River immediately notified

Perkins that she needed to provide invoices evidencing the amount
of expense she had incurred.

Perkins concocted invoices showing

her mother charged Perkins for room and board and laundry
services provided in Utah in an amount exceeding $80.00 per day.
Incredibly, Perkins' mother made these charges to Perkins for
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several months when Perkins was not even living in the State of
Utah.

When Bear River challenged these claims, Perkins admitted

she was not living in the State of Utah during most of the time
she was claiming the additional living expenses.

In fact, at

trial Perkins withdrew her claim for additional living expenses
in an attempt to prevent evidence of her chicanery from being
presented to the jury.
Perkins7 expert also admitted that Bear River was

justified

in not paying claims that had not been adequately supported with
documentation pursuant to the policy.

Perkins7 expert admitted

that Bear River had no obligation to pay Perkins7 claim for
additional living expenses.
Perkins further attempted to make improvements to her home
that were beyond the scope of fire restoration, she submitted
false claims, and submitted duplicate claims.

Bear River,

nevertheless, paid in excess of $91,000 to Perkins.

There can be

no question that the overwhelming weight of evidence in this case
supports the jury's finding that Bear River did not breach its
insurance contract with Perkins and that Bear River did not act
in bad faith.
In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)
the Supreme Court of Utah stated that in a first party bad faith
action, the insured must establish at a minimum that: (1) the
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insurer failed to diligently investigate the facts to enable it
to determine whether a claim is valid; (2) that the insurer did
not fairly evaluate the claim; and (3) that the insurer did not
act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
Id. at 801. Perkins has failed to marshall any evidence to
substantiate her bad faith claim.

Rather, the evidence

overwhelmingly establishes that Bear River did immediately and
diligently investigate the facts to determine whether the claim
was valid.

Bear River fairly evaluated the claim and acted

promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Drive fire and evidence that
the May 19, 1990 fire was intentionally set had little if any
impact on the outcome of this trial.

If the trial court

committed error, clearly the error was harmless and did not
affect the outcome of the proceedings.
II.

The Trial Court Correctly Handled Counsel for Bear River's
Comments in Opening Statement Regarding Insurance Fraud
a.

Mention of Insurance Fraud in Bear River's Opening
Statement did not warrant a Mistrial
In answering the amended third-party complaint of

Perkins, Bear River set forth several affirmative defense. Bear
River's sixth affirmative defense stated that Perkins had
intentionally and knowingly submitted or caused to be submitted
false insurance claims pertaining to the type and value of the
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real and personal property damage and pertaining to additional
living expenses, with the intent that Bear River would rely
thereon.

(R. 523).

During opening statement at trial, counsel for Bear River
stated that Perkins had submitted claims to Bear River which
constituted fraud.

(R. 2838, 2840, 2843 and 2846).

Counsel for

Perkins, following opening statements, immediately made a motion
for a mistrial or in the alternative that the trial court
admonish the jury with regard to the statements made by Bear
River's counsel concerning insurance fraud.

At the conclusion of

counsel for Perkins argument relating to this motion he stated:
I therefore stand on the motion, you honor, for a
mistrial, or in the alternative to admonish the jury.
(R. 5332). (Emphasis added).
The court denied Perkins7 Motion for a Mistrial but stated
that he was somewhat concerned as far as the wording of Bear
River's answer and in the use of the term fraud and insurance
fraud.

The court then requested that counsel for Perkins and

counsel for Bear River prepare an admonishment to be read to the
jury.

(R. 5333).
Counsel for Bear River and counsel for Perkins stipulated

and agreed upon an instruction that the court could give the jury
pertaining to the matter of insurance fraud.
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Counsel for Bear

River stated to the court on the record in the presence of
counsel for Perkins the following:
Yes, your honor, during the noon recess, we have
presented to the court, in view of the court's ruling
this morning on the issue of insurance fraud, a
suggested and agreed instruction the court can give the
jury pertaining to the matter of insurance fraud, the
opening statement, and how the jury should view that
issue.
(R. 3216).

(Emphasis added).

Counsel for Bear River made a motion at the same time to
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.

After hearing

argument from counsel for Perkins, the court denied Bear River's
motion to amend the pleading to conform to the evidence with
respect to the issue of fraud.

With the stipulation and

agreement between counsel for Bear River and counsel for Perkins,
the court read the statement prepared by counsel for Perkins and
counsel for Bear River to the jury as follows:
The record may show that all members of the jury are
present. In our discussions with counsel, and our
arguments, we have resolved one matter which we would
like to call to your attention. I'm going to read a
statement to you and ask you to listen closely to it,
and you'll then be considering this statement with all
of the other things which you consider as far as the
case is concerned.
In the opening statement of counsel of Bear River, on
Monday afternoon, reference was made to the potential
of showing insurance fraud on the part of third party
plaintiff and defendant Perkins.
I instruct you that the court has determined as a
matter of law that insurance fraud is not an issue in
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this case, and you shall not consider the same in your
deliberations.
You shall disregard any reference by Mr. Heath to
insurance fraud as part of the opening statement.
That does not mean, however, that Bear River may not
attempt, to show, under the evidence, that incorrect,
inaccurate or false statements were made by Ms. Perkins
in submitting claims to Bear River Insurance Company.
That is an issue which you may consider in accordance
with the instructions of law given to you after all the
evidence has been presented.
(R. 3221 - 3222).
Counsel for Bear River's reference to insurance fraud in his
opening statement was adequately, efficiently and effectively
handled by the trial court through the admonition that was
prepared and stipulated to by both counsel for Perkins and
counsel for Bear River.

The trial judge thus did not commit

error in the way the insurance fraud evidence was handled and in
the admonition to the jury.
Regarding statements by counsel, the Supreme Court of Utah
addressed the issue of improper remarks during closing argument.
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 282 (Utah 1992).

The Court

found that appellant's argument that plaintiff's counsel's
remarks during closing argument warranted a new trial, was
without merit.

The Court stated that in order to grant a new

trial based on the misstatements of counsel the lower court must
have committed plain error.
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To meet the criteria for application of the plain error
doctrine, an error must be obvious and harmful. The Court found
that the misstatement of testimony in the trial court was not
plain nor obvious. The Court concluded that the
mischaracterization of testimony did not plainly misrepresent the
facts of the case and would not add significantly to the jury's
perception of the events.

Id. at 839-840.

Similarly, the trial court, in the instant case, did not
commit error by allowing counsel for Bear River, in his opening
statement, to mention insurance fraud.

In fact, not only were

the comments regarding fraud insignificant in relation to the
evidence that was put on in the 9 day trial, the trial court
corrected the problem by admonishing the jury to disregard the
remarks of Bear River's counsel.
b,

Perkins Has Waived Her Right To Appeal With Respect to
the Insurance Fraud Issue
Counsel for Perkins made a Motion for Mistrial relating

to counsel for Bear River's comments regarding insurance fraud.
However, counsel for Perkins stated his motion, in the
alternative:

Counsel for Perkins stated as follows:

I therefore stand on the Motion, your honor, for a
mistrial, or in the alternative, to admonish the jury.
(R. 5332).

(Emphasis added).
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The trial court did in fact choose the alternative and
admonish the jury.

In fact, the trial court admonished the jury

using language drafted and stipulated to by counsel for Perkins
and counsel for Bear River.
verbatim.

The trial court read this admonition

Consequently, Perkins has waived any right to appeal

on this issue.

Perkins requested in the alternative that the

court admonish the jury.

The court did admonish the jury and the

problem was rectified.
Perkins alleges in her appellate brief that after the
admonition to the jury, the trial court confused the jury by
submitting the issue of fraud to the jury through an inadvertent
instruction.

Perkins never objected at the time to the way the

trial court dealt with the jury instruction.

Following the

court's admonition to the jury, no other objections or motions
were made in connection with the insurance fraud issue.
Therefore, Perkins has waived any right to appeal on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforesaid, the trial court's rulings on the
evidentiary issues should not be reversed and the jury verdict
and judgment thereon as it pertains to Bear River should be
affirmed.
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